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Contested identities: exploring the cultural, historical and political complexities of the 
‘three Chinas’ 
Dr. Qiao Li 
Prof. Ros Jennings 
Abstract 
When facing the political, historical and cultural complexities of Mainland China, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, problematic issues arise in relation to understanding the sorts of national/cultural 
identities that might be projected by them. With regard to these three Chinese language 
cinemas, a traditional national cinema approach focussing predominantly upon nation-state as 
a source of meaning would provide only a limited understanding of the meanings generated. 
This article, however, draws on what Benedict Anderson (1991) put forward as the theory of 
‘Imagined Communities’ which assumes a large body of people regard themselves as members 
of a ‘nation’ (and here we interpret this term broadly and beyond understandings of 
geographical borders and political systems) through a variety of historical legacies, cultural 
memories and acts of consumption. In this article we hold the assumption that there is a shared 
cultural meaning (namely ‘Chineseness’) that extends across the three Chinese language 
cinemas and consider cultural affinity as greater than national and political boundaries. 
Keywords: National cinema, Three Chinas, Chineseness, cultural affinity 
Introduction: ‘three Chinas’ and the Problematic of ‘the National’ 
Over the last two decades, Chinese language film studies (and here we refer to studies of not 
just mainland Chinese cinema but also of Hong Kong and Taiwan) have become the focus of 
intense interest in academia in both China and the West. The term Chinese cinema or Chinese 
national cinema both seem to be problematic when facing the ideological and political 
differences in the governments of the three areas. For example, there is a lot of discourse within 
Taiwan regarding the use of the terms Zhonghua, Zhongguo and Zhongwen and which terms 
are most appropriate to refer to Taiwan.  In this article, the term Chinese language cinemas, is 
not a political claim. As a linguistic category instead of a national category, Chinese language 
cinemas (including both Mandarin and regional dialects such as Cantonese in Hong Kong and 
Hokkien and Minnan in Taiwan etc.) should be considered a broader term to refer to the 
cinemas of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The political separation (and of course 
the re-integration of Hong Kong in 1997 as a Special Administrative Region of China) of the 
three cinemas has troubled film scholars for years. For some, the history of the separation of 
film industries in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan has created “quite distinctive national cinemas 
within each territory” (Yueh, 1998: 74) and, on the whole, the study of Chinese language 
cinemas has been conducted and organized by means of geographical/political distinction and 
the notion of ‘three Chinas’ (Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) has dominated in 
relation to studies of national cinema. This geographical determinism limits and, to some extent 
denies, the Chinese cultural tradition within the three cinemas. This article, however, draws on 
what Benedict Anderson (1991) put forward as the theory of ‘Imagined Communities’ which 
assumes a large body of people regard themselves as members of a ‘nation’ (and here I interpret 
this term broadly and beyond understandings of geographical borders and political systems) 
through a variety of historical legacies, cultural memories and acts of consumption. Cultural 
identity, as Stuart Hall (2004) suggests, is situated at the point of intersection of politics, 
technology and social transformation. Thus signifiers of Chinese traditional culture can be 
considered as a shared culture and history that permeate all three cinemas in their different 
ways.   
Such a model does not mean that this article denies the cultural specificities of three Chinese 
language cinemas. For example, in Mainland China, the Fifth Generation’s filmmakers (such 
as Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige etc.) have always been obsessed with the Cultural Revolution 
since 1980s. Interestingly, in the context of post-Olympics Chinese language cinemas, Zhang 
Yimou’s new film Coming Home (2014) is again a tragic romance set in the Cultural 
Revolution. The term Post-Olympics Chinese language Cinema originated from “Post-
Olympics Chinese Cinema Symposium” hosted by Bader International Study Centre, Queens 
University between December 10 and 11 2013. The implication of the film’s title Coming 
Home (Gui Lai as its Chinese original title means return) might well signify Zhang’s Gui Lai 
(return) to his obsession with the Cultural Revolution. The complexity of Hong Kong in terms 
of national/cultural identity can be seen to be a product of influences from China, Britain and 
its own Cantonese ‘nativeness’. In Taiwan, in particular under the president Chen Shui-bian 
between 2000 and 2008, part of the movement toward national and political autonomy was to 
promote cultural distinctiveness (namely ‘Taiwaneseness’), and so there has been a promotion 
of the goddess Matsu, promotion of aboriginal studies, and aggressive promotion of the various 
Taiwanese languages etc., with the objective to promote the idea that Taiwanese culture is 
separate and distinct from that of Mainland China. While much of that rift has been diminished 
under the current KMT (Kuomingtang, Chinese Nationalist Party) administration, much of 
those sentiments still exist within the population. 
One of the most recent surveys regarding the national and pan-national identification in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong conducted by Frank Liu and Francis Lee (2013) confirms that many Taiwanese 
citizens prefer to identify themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese. The same awareness of 
self-identification between being ‘Chinese’ or ‘Hong Kongese’ exists among Hong Kong 
citizens. “Faced with the rise of the PRC’s economic and political power, influenced by the 
ROC legacy, and having experienced decades of democratization, Taiwanese society has 
nurtured multiple country and national identifications. Similarly in Hong Kong, a political 
entity with unique colonial experiences and an independent civil identity, society also faces 
challenges regarding (re)identifying with the PRC” (Liu and Lee 2013: 1131). Especially in 
Taiwan, while many within Taiwan share a Chinese cultural heritage (predominantly those who 
are descended from KMT migrants of 1948), there is a large and vocal group that deny Chinese 
cultural heritage considering themselves to be distinctly culturally Taiwanese Hokklo, 
aboriginal or other local identities that have a parallel but separate history with the Mainland. 
For many in Taiwan, particularly those of the Pan Green Coalition of the Democratic 
Progressive Party, there is a sense of parallel history, but a history which equally encompasses 
its Portuguese and Japanese occupations and cultural legacies. 
 
In a post-colonial context it is almost impossible to define what exactly constitutes a nation. 
When facing the political, historical and cultural complexities of Mainland China, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, a traditional national cinema approach focussing predominantly upon nation-state 
as a source of meaning becomes problematic. Therefore I am replacing a national cinema 
framework with a post-national methodology that unifies through cultural signifiers rather than 
through political or national ones. One of the central benefits of the article is that it is possible 
to argue that the cinemas of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan share and portray a rich 
cultural heritage in their films despite difficulties and antagonisms that exist in the political 
relations between them. One way that we will try to approach this problem is by looking for 
signifiers of Chinese traditional culture and the ways that they might manifest themselves 
across the three cinemas. In doing so we will place particular emphasis on the connections 
between the three Chinese language cinemas in terms of Chinese cultures and traditions. We 
hold the assumption that there is a shared cultural meaning (cultural affinity) that extends 
across three Chinese language cinemas and I use the term ‘Chineseness’ to refer to expressions 
of shared cultural, historical and philosophical continuity across especially the three New Wave 
cinemas. 
 
Conceiving National Cinema: National Identity and Political Manipulation 
Prior to the 1980s critical writing on cinema adopted common-sense notions of national 
cinema. The idea of national cinema has long informed the promotion of non-Hollywood 
cinemas (Crofts, 1998: 385). The dominance of Hollywood meant that as far back as the 1920s 
and 1930s, France and Germany formed their national cinemas almost in ideological opposition 
to Hollywood. In her book French National Cinema, Susan Hayward (1993: 5) explains that 
by the 1920s calls were being made in France for “a truly national cinema as a defense against 
the American hegemony, all of which (in the implicit concern for the well-being of cinema) 
points to a historicism and narcissism of sorts”.  
 
It was not until 1989 that Andrew Higson defined The Concept of National Cinema in a broader 
sense: he suggests that national cinema should be defined not only in terms of “the films 
produced by and within a particular nation state” (Higson, 2002: 132-142), but also in terms of 
distribution and exhibition, audiences, and critical and cultural discourses. This is one of the 
first general considerations of national cinema. Higson (2002) indicates that national cinema 
should not only be considered in relation to where films are made but more especially in 
relation to what kind of cultural identity they project and how they are consumed globally. In 
terms of national cinema, ‘Chineseness’ becomes a form of cultural capital that is shaped 
through transnational discourses that are negotiated in history. Ideas about degrees of 
authenticity as Chinese, which are seen as derived from links to territory and knowledge of 
‘traditional’ Chinese cultures such as Confucianism and Taoism, have become a basis through 
which diaspora Chinese define themselves in relation to one another. 
 
Facing the complexities of the three Chinese language cinemas, Zhang Yingjin (2004) feels 
that ‘the National’ is difficult to define and considers nationalism, instead of any particular 
cultural or artistic trait, as the most dominant characteristic of Chinese cinema. The political 
nature of nationalism cannot be disputed whether it is overtly expressed in film projects or not. 
The concept of nationality is similarly loaded. In the era of globalization, the studies of national 
cinema have been facing complexities brought by transnational cultural and capital flow. The 
term ‘transnational Chinese cinema’ in film studies has appeared to be popular since late 1990s. 
For many (Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, 1997), the ‘transnational’ becomes a tool for them to 
approach the complex connections among three Chinese language cinemas and Chinese 
diasporic filmmaking in the era of globalization. However, as Chris Berry and Mary Faquhar 
point out that Hong Kong was “never a nation-state”. Though diplomatically Taiwan possesses 
a ‘quasi-national’ status, it has never declared its independence and it is still not an official 
member of the United Nations at the international stage. Berry’s ‘Transnational Chinese 
Cinema Studies’ (2011) is a key document for conceptualising the term ‘transnational’ in the 
Chinese case. By referring to Will Higbee and Song Hwee Lim (2010), Berry (2011: 9) 
articulates the three patterns regarding the usage of the term ‘transnational’ among which the 
second pattern “focuses on cultural formations that sustain cinemas that exceed the borders of 
individual nation-states or operate at a more local level within them; for example, Arab-
language cinemas, Chinese language cinemas”. Although focusing on the multiple and 
conflicting meanings of the term ‘transnational’ with reference to internationality and 
globalization, Berry (2011: 14) does not deny that cultural affinity is a larger force that shapes 
‘the national’ in three Chinese language cinemas in certain ways. Valentina Vitali and Paul 
Willemen (2006) stress the importance of the studies of national cinema and the need to 
continually revise the theories/concepts of national cinema. I need to further clarify the term 
‘the national’. Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (1991) is perhaps the most-cited theory of nationalism. By nationalism, Anderson 
argues how people in different parts of a territory who have never seen each other conceive of 
themselves as an intimate community, which in fact, is an imagined identity. Anderson (1991: 
4) claims that: “… nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word’s multiple 
significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a particular kind”. 
 
Consequently this ‘Imaged Community’ functions as a post-Enlightenment organizer of 
populations, affected by the huge migrations and diasporas resulting from post-Second World 
War processes of decolonization (Croft, 1998, 386-387). And the constructedness of ‘the 
National’, or “to construct the history of a nation or national cinema as coherent, unified, 
homogeneous, is to lend support to its erasure of difference and to the maintenance of a centrist 
and neo-conservative cultural politics” (Faulkner, 1994: 7). Faulkner’s assertion is useful in 
supporting this article’s arguments as it simplifies the complexities of Chinese cinemas when 
the article underpins a homogenous identity projected by three Chinese language cinemas.  
 
However, this homogeneity cannot exclude the differentiation of the three cinemas in terms of 
cultural specificities, as each of them possesses different political and historical experiences. 
According to Hall (2004), there are at least two senses of identity: identity as being (which 
offers a sense of unity and commonality) and identity as becoming (or a process of 
identification, which shows the discontinuity in our identity formation). “The first position 
defines ‘cultural identity’ in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of collective ‘one true self’, 
hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed ‘selves’, which people 
with a shared history and ancestry hold in common” (Hall, 2004: 387). This is particularly 
useful for the article when highlighting the role of Chinese culture and traditions among 
Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Hall (2004) also points out the heterogeneity of 
identity. His assertion helps to support the cultural specificities of each of the three Chinese 
language cinemas while arguing their homogeneity and heterogeneity in terms of 
cultural/national identity. In his Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation, Hall (2004: 
386) states: “Identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps, instead of 
thinking of identity as an already accomplished historical fact, which the new cinematic 
discourses then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a “production,” which is 
never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation.” 
This critical discourse may be well applied to the Chinese case where three cinemas are 
geographically and politically separated but which retain strong cultural connections. 
 
The role of culture in the constructedness of identity in the Chinese case is similar to Hayward’s 
(1993) argument about French National Cinema. In her study of French National Cinema, 
Hayward states that: “In response to how France was perceived from outside … it will be useful 
to retain … the essential notions of nation as myth and nation as difference and continuity as 
well as the notion of the enunciative role of ideology” (Hayward, 1993: 5). Hayward 
emphasizes the role of national culture in the constructedness of national identity. Nation-ness 
is characterized by its own myth and allegory. It is clear that culture plays an important role in 
the formation of nation. Arjun Appadurai (1996) highlights the role of culture in the production 
of nationhood, and it is here that cinema occupies an important position as a mass medium: 
“Modern nationalisms involve communities of citizens in the territorial defined nation-state 
who share the collective experience, not of face-to-face contact or common subordination to a 
royal person, but of reading books, pamphlets, newspapers, maps, and other modern texts 
together” (Appadurai, 1996: 161). 
 
Anderson (1991:18) calls these collective experiences “print capitalism” and “electronic 
capitalism”. However, recently Higson (2006) problematises Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined 
community’ by making the following statement: “The ‘imagined community’ argument thus 
sometimes seems unable to acknowledge the cultural difference and diversity that invariably 
marks both the inhabitants of a particular nation-state and members of more geographically 
dispersed ‘national’ communities” (Higson, 2006: 18). Higson’s statement is also true in the 
case of the three Chinese language cinemas. From this perspective, while exploring the 
‘Chineseness’ represented across the three Chinese language cinemas, like both Hall (2004) 
and Higson (2006)’s arguments, we also acknowledge the discontinuity and differentiation of 
cultural identity in the Chinese case where politics has played an important role, especially for 
Taiwan which is still politically separated from Mainland China. As Schubert (2004: 534) 
points out, Taiwanese political party system “is conceived of as ideologically divided into pro-
independence (“pan-green”) and pro-unification (“pan-blue”) camps that support two 
diverging concepts of nationalism, one Taiwanese and one Chinese”. A survey conducted by 
Yun-han Chu (2004) regarding Taiwan’s national identity—independence or unification, also 
shows that strong ideological differentiations exist among Taiwanese public. 
 
Although Hong Kong and Taiwan have been either geographically or politically separated from 
Chinese mainland for years, the collective experience remains through the influence of Chinese 
traditional culture. For example, In Hong Kong cinema, the theme of Confucian ethics has not 
only constantly appeared in the Shaw Brothers’ productions, but it has also dominated most 
Hong Kong martial arts and action films, in which protagonists are always bonded with family 
and brotherhood , such as John Woo’s A Better Tomorrow (1986, 1987) and The Killer (1990). 
According to Confucianism, every social role should strictly abide to his behavioral rules. The 
representation of Confucianism in Hong Kong cinema becomes evident for the continuity of 
Chinese traditions and culture in this former British colony. Among the productions of the 
Shaw Brothers, one typical film of traditional familial ethic is The Magic Lamp (Wu 
Jiangxiang, 1964). The story is popular among Chinese. It is about Chen Xiang who saves his 
mother by overcoming the toughest difficulties and fighting against evils. This film obviously 
follows the Confucian code regarding a son’s filial piety. Another film, which should be 
mentioned here, is My Young Auntie (Liu Jiangliang, 1980). In this comedy a young lady 
becomes the aunt of an old man’s nephews and at the same time, she has to come to terms with 
her social position on many levels as the old man’s nephews who are also almost the same age 
as her. As emphasized by Confucianism, young people must respect eldership and eldership 
must be respectful. Although they are of almost same age, still they must follow the rules 
according to their positions in a Confucian family hierarchy. Thus comedies happen frequently 
in this film.  
 
For Taiwanese cinema, the influence of Chinese traditional culture, philosophy and morality is 
clearly evident in films such as The Wedding Banquet (Ang Lee, 1993). At the beginning of 
the film, the parents who represent the dominance of Chinese traditional culture come to New 
York. Within such a Confucian familial hierarchy, Weitong and Simon, while representing 
Western culture, show great respect for the parents. However, after the encounter of the two 
cultures both sides have to make a compromise in order to facilitate an enduring relationship. 
Ang Lee’s control of characters is also influenced by the philosophy of ‘the golden mean’ of 
Confucianism which highlights the need to be moderate. His uniqueness lies in the way this 
philosophy is represented cinematically. In his cinema, he combines more sensitive Chinese 
cultural characteristics, such as deepness, mystery and tenderness, with freedom and 
individualism of the West. The narrative, as in many of his films, such as Pushing Hands 
(1991), Eat Drink Men Women (1994), possesses the style of Chinese traditional literary 
narratives: ambiguity, refinement and obscurity. 
 
The Encounter between Tradition, Modernity and Politics 
Since the 1980s, three New Wave cinemas emerged in Mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. The history of the New Wave in film scholarship (dating from post WWII Italian Neo-
Realism and the French New Wave), is essentially linked to modernity. As John Orr (1993: 6) 
states “…the neo-modern moment has its origin in the national cinemas of Western Europe and 
the United States where it engages with Western capitalist modernity”. In terms of national 
cinemas, European art cinemas differ from others through their portrayal of specific class 
formations. In particular as Ginette Vincendeau (2001) suggests the role of “Heritage Cinema” 
is to largely query the life-worlds of the upper middle classes. However, the three Chinese 
language cinemas that I am investigating have arisen out of the clash between the traditional 
and the modern, between myth and religion on the one hand and political ideologies on the 
other. Out of the socio-political complexities and geographical separations of these three areas, 
history, tradition and continuity provide the links in terms of a shared cultural identity across 
them. Without this key recognition, the whole discourse of cinema and modernity becomes 
vacuous (Orr, 1993). The great paradox of film and modernization is that the New Wave 
cinemas in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan often deal with questions, if not always 
representations, of ‘the past’.  Any examination of the identity/identities of the three New Wave 
cinemas in our study must also consider notions of tradition, religion and religious-based 
philosophies and politics. Thus in approaching ideas of ‘national identity’ it is profitable to 
begin with the concept of ‘tradition’ as we would argue that the concept of national identity as 
projected by the cinemas that we are investigating are closely associated with concepts of 
tradition and issues to do with the past. 
 
Traditions are usually regarded as practices, customs, or stories that are memorized and passed 
down from generation to generation (forming a rich part of oral history and oral culture from 
societies where the knowledge and means to write were not widespread). However, Eric 
Hobsbawm (2012: 1) states that “‘traditions’ which appear or claim to be old are often quite 
recent in origin and sometimes invented”. According to Hobsbawm (2012), some traditions 
were deliberately invented for one reason or another, often to highlight or enhance the 
importance of certain institutions. Traditions may also be changed to suit the needs of the day, 
and the changes can become accepted as a part of the ancient tradition. He states: “Invented 
tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted 
rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm, 
2012: 1). 
 
This assumption regarding ‘tradition’ is important to this article because the understanding of 
the manipulated nature of ‘tradition’ will help us better understand the shared heritage, 
practices, and filmmakers’ nostalgia that are manifest within films made in different 
geographical locations. For example, In the Mood for Love (Wong Kar-wai, 2000) invented a 
kind of ‘new Orientalism’ bringing together allegories and symbols with deep Chinese cultural 
connotations such as Shanghai dialect, Chinese feminine dress Cheong-sam, with nostalgia for 
1960’s Hong Kong. This nostalgia is also manifest in Taiwanese New Cinema with a different 
cultural context. There is an interesting plot in Dust in the Wind (Hou Hsiao-hsian, 1986) when 
the fishing boat from Mainland China gets lost and lands on Golden Gate (Taiwan’s territory), 
in which the fishermen on the boat are received by the Taiwanese army of Golden Gate. These 
mainland Chinese are afraid of the Taiwanese army but the Taiwanese army warmly welcomes 
them with an impassioned reception. The army gives the fishermen’s family gifts and in a long 
farewell scene the army emotionally watches the fishing boat leaving Taiwan. This sequence 
seems to suggest that the other side of the Taiwan Strait, where the Chinese mainland is 
situated, is the native land of many Taiwanese people. There is a deep-rooted connection 
between people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This may be viewed as Hou Hsiao-
hsian’s cultural feeling towards Mainland China. It is related to his personal diasporic 
experience and it is also the representation of an emotional longing of many Taiwanese of 
Chinese origin for Mainland China. For many Taiwanese, Chinese traditions and culture seem 
to be the memories of their childhood which may fade with years but which are still deeply 
rooted in their heart. If KMT has attempted to construct Taiwan as a ‘legitimate China’ that is 
in competition with the People’s Republic of China, Hou sets out to challenge this officialdom 
by strengthening the remembrance of Chinese mainland as a collective nostalgia. 
 
 
However, it is equally important to be aware of the fact that Chinese mainland, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan have different motivators for nostalgia based on their own socio-political specificities: 
Hong Kong and Taiwan were both exiled from the Mainland for a long time, which would 
result in a different motivator for recalling the past that they had lost continuity to. For example, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, many Hong Kong martial arts films looked back to events in Chinese 
history, especially turbulent historical periods such as the Japanese occupation in the 1930s and 
Chinese civil war in the 1940s. In these films, the stories of the past illustrated the complicated 
relationship between individual and nation in terms of fate and destiny. They also praised 
loyalty and patriotism. These films, such as Fist of Fury (Luo Wei, 1972), The Way of the 
Dragon (Bruce Lee, 1972), touched national memory and cultural emotions and thus they 
achieved great success in Hong Kong, Mainland China and Taiwan. Contrastively, Mainland 
China went through the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, which was not shared by 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, and so their post revolution films similarly were impelled by a 
motivation to ‘rediscover’ the past, such as the films of the Fifth Generation’s Filmmakers: The 
Yellow Earth (Chen Kaige, 1984) and Red Sorghum (Zhang Yimou, 1987) etc., a motivation 
which was not shared by Hong Kong or Taiwan. 
 
When film, both a western technology and an exotic thing for Chinese people, was introduced 
to Mainland China about one hundred years ago, the idea of film as a medium was also 
influenced by Chinese traditional thinking. Here our starting point is the idea that because of 
their shared cultural histories that forms of ‘Chineseness’ will be manifest and represented in 
the three cinemas constituting at least one dimension of ‘national identity’ (but not necessarily 
in a unified or homogenous way). Here the term ‘Chineseness’ refers to those historically 
recognized cultural factors/elements such as the philosophies and belief systems stemming 
from Confucianism and Taoism and also aspects of folklore, customs, allegories and symbolic 
cultural emblems as typified by the existence of the martial arts hero across the three cinemas 
and in many of the transnational films of directors of Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
origin. 
 
The influence of Confucianism and Taoism is represented not only in Chinese, Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese filmmaking practices (in the case of the latter two in a more complex way because 
of various colonial influences, such as British, Japanese and Dutch colonial experience) but 
also as a consistent frame of reference. Chinese traditional philosophy is based on the 
syncretism of heaven and human beings (heaven here refers to the universe/nature). This 
philosophical approach makes heaven the object of perception and human beings as the subject 
of perception. This philosophy provides the backbone of recognised social rules within Chinese 
cultures. Expressed as ‘harmony’ in Taoist philosophy and ‘the Golden Mean’ in Confucianism, 
Confucianism and Taoism accentuate the interdependent relationships between nature and 
humanity. In doing so, this neutralizes the conflict between subject and object, and between 
human beings and nature. This epistemological basis leads to a preoccupation with reflections 
on the human condition and the experiences of sadness and joy. 
 
In the article when trying to investigate the presence of Chinese traditional culture and 
philosophies on filmmaking in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan it is also hard to pin 
down what Chinese traditional cultures are in an exact sense. On the one hand, there is a sense 
of the ‘original essence’ of Chinese philosophies and approaches to life (outlined briefly above 
in terms of ways of thinking, cultural beliefs and traditions). On the other hand, there is also an 
embodiment of the specific historical, political and social contexts in which such belief systems 
are created. We are seeking here to present an understanding of Chinese culture that sees it as 
complex in terms of its connection to and dislocation from the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. This leads me in turn to explore issues such as the relationship between modernity, 
cultural identities and traditional ways of thinking/belief systems. 
 
The notion of traditional culture as an ‘original essence’ is especially interesting when explored 
in relation to three national/geographical identities that are distinct but also share strong 
cultural roots. For instance, for five thousand years the majority of the Chinese populations 
(mainland Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwanese) have been made up of peasants, which led to 
the culture of tudi (土地). The Chinese term tudi may be translated as earth/land in English. 
However, the term embodies a more profound meaning in a Chinese context. It refers to the 
agricultural civilization which is traditionally considered as the principal part of Chinese 
civilizations. Tudi, or earth, is what has nourished Chinese people for centuries. From this 
perspective, tudi also takes on a similar role to that of terroir in French civilization which 
symbolizes a sense of place/belonging. Unsurprisingly tudi is highly venerated and it possesses 
paramount spiritual position among Chinese people. Symbolically tudi is both the mother and 
the home for Chinese people. Its influence can be seen at the heart of Confucianism/Taoism 
and the ways that it has shaped Chinese societies for over two thousand years. Confucius (1996: 
45) says: “while father and mother are alive, a good son does not wander far afield”. Because 
tudi may be considered as the origin of Chinese civilization its influence on filmmaking can be 
seen in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong (particularly in the films of the Fifth 
Generation in Mainland China, the Taiwanese New Cinema and Hong Kong  New Wave 
cinema in the 1980s). It is no accident that the title of the first internationally acclaimed film 
of the Fifth Generation, Huang Tudi (Yellow Earth, Kaige Chen, 1984), signals a post-cultural 
revolution reflection on identity based on a return to ‘countryside’. As Chow notes: 
“…reflecting on ‘culture’ inevitable involves the rethinking of origins—the ‘pasts’ that give 
rise to the present moment; the narratives, myths, rituals, customs, and practices that account 
for how a people becomes what it is” (Chow, 1995: 174). 
 
Yellow Earth is the first internationally acclaimed film for the Fifth Generation and has 
received widespread academic attention. The film is set in 1930s’ Shanxi, which is located in 
Western China where the yellow soil forms a distinctive geographical feature. As mentioned 
earlier, Chinese civilization is founded on agriculture. Yellow earth (tudi) is also symbolic of 
the home or the mother for Chinese people and Chinese civilization as a whole. The most 
distinctive success of Yellow Earth is undoubtedly Zhang Yimou’s cinematography. This film 
made Zhang’s reputation as the best cameraman in China. Graduating from the 
Cinematography Department of the Beijing Film Academy in the same year as Chen, Zhang’s 
cinematographic style is unique in Chinese cinema and this gave the film Yellow Earth a 
significant character through its artistic composition. Again Taoist painting has influenced 
Zhang’s cinematography but his style also connected the characteristics of both Eastern and 
Western aesthetics in his cinematography. For Esther C. M. Yau (2006: 202), “the static views 
of distant ravines and slopes of the Loess Plateau resemble a Chinese scroll-painting of the 
Changan School”. In fact, the vast landscape and the yellow earth also symbolise the home and 
mother of Chinese people and Chinese civilization. It is on such ‘poor’ and vast yellow earth 
that Chinese people struggled with their fate in the post-Cultural Revolution period. Indeed, 
the effect of this collaborative aesthetic achieved with Zhang’s elaborate cinematography 
visually presents a metaphor for the socio-political context of this period. 
 
In Taiwan, the direct reflection of tudi may experience a certain transition or variation. The 
same happened in Hong Kong cinema since it is more a commercial cinema, especially post-
1960s. However, the ideology of tudi is not excluded to its martial arts films and gangster 
cinema, which is transformed into the protection of ‘homeland’ and worship of community. 
The notion of bao jia wei guo (to protect our homes and defend our country) has been 
paramount to Chinese people since ancient times. Among many martial arts films, protagonists 
constantly feature as a national hero against foreign aggression. Huang Feihong in Once Upon 
a Time in China (Tsui Hark, 1991) and its sequels can perhaps be regarded as one of the most 
patriotic characters. The notion of tudi (here an unseparated unity of both home and country) 
and the poetical justice are two main themes in the films of Bruce Lee as well as the Once 
Upon a Time in China series. Both Bruce Lee’s characters and the character Huang Feihong 
show their Confucian morality: wisdom, kindness, braveness, loyalty and forgiveness. These 
films also illustrated a spiritual world of Confucianism: Kung Fu is not a resort for conquering 
others and gaining power or profit. It is in fact a way for cultivating one’s morality, self-
dependence and practicing poetical justice when necessary. 
 
More pervasive than a particular relationship to the earth is perhaps the dominance of the 
spiritual and ethical framework for living that is supplied by Confucianism and Taoism which 
constitute, like Hellenism, Hebraism and Germanic tradition in the West, the core of Chinese 
culture. They have shaped Chinese societies for over two thousand years and have become the 
core of Chinese civilization. The influence of Confucianism and Taoism also shaped many 
Eastern Asian countries such as Japan, Singapore and South Korea. As Mijun Park and 
Catherine Chesla state: “Confucianism is not merely a Chinese philosophy. As with other great 
ancient philosophies, such as Buddhism and Daoism, Confucianism was introduced to EA 
countries and deeply influenced the formation of every aspect of life. Confucianism was the 
philosophic ground of much of the culture in East and Southeast Asia” (Park and Chesla,  
2007: 297). 
 
To understand the role of Confucianism and Taoism in Chinese civilization will help us better 
understand how Chinese and nations of Chinese origin became what they are. If China does 
not have its own religion (Buddhism finds its origin in India), then Confucianism and Taoism, 
the two philosophical schools can be viewed as two ‘religions’ since ancient times in China. 
The Confucian ideology of order (more from a moral perspective) plays an important role in 
the formation of Chinese society and family, and it is important for us to understand the theme 
of family, father-son relationship from a Confucian perspective in the films of the three Chinese 
language cinemas. 
 
Taoism also has a significant influence in Chinese thinking. For Taoism, or Tao, the basic idea 
is that behind all material things and all the change in the world there lies one fundamental, 
universal principle: ‘the Way’ or Tao. “The Way that can be told of is not an Unvarying way; 
The names that can be named are not unvarying names. It was from the Nameless that Heaven 
and Earth sprang; The named is but the mother that rears the ten thousand creatures, each after 
its kind (Lao Tzu, 1997: 3)”. The purpose of human life, then, is to live life according to Tao, 
which requires passivity, calm, non-striving, humility, and lack of planning, for to plan is to go 
against the Tao. Different to Taoism, Confucianism emphasizes the way of living in society. If 
Taoism can be viewed as the way of living in harmony with nature, then Confucianism is the 
way of residing within society. Confucianism emphasizes disciplines, beliefs and virtues such 
as loyalty, brotherhood love and filial piety. These Confucian codes have been found useful by 
Chinese emperors for their feudal governance and it has always been adopted by feudal regimes 
as the main spiritual belief in Chinese history for more than two thousand years. 
        
 
The four cardinal virtues of Confucianism are filial piety, brotherhood, loyalty, and trust; and 
the Taoist philosophy of harmony between nature and humanity are paramount in Chinese 
cultures. The codes of Confucianism and Taoism have shaped and constituted Chinese 
cultural/national identity in the cinemas of the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
these cultural codes persisting as mythic symbols of national identity and national narratives. 
Thus in the formation of ‘the National’ in the three Chinese language cinemas we are 
investigating, the main tenet/beliefs of Confucianism and Taoism take central place. Despite 
this centrality, Confucianism and Taoism are not one single unified concept but a series of 
ancient traditions and approaches that, as I will argue, can endure across geographical and 
political separations. 
        
Confucian and Taoist ideologies also act as a cultural core for the aesthetics of Chinese films. 
This will also be an important element for our arguments regarding the cultural identity of the 
three Chinese language cinemas and the authorial signatures of certain auteur directors. From 
an aesthetic perspective, Chris Berry and Mary Ann Farquhar (1999) have explored the 
relationship between Chinese painting and Chinese films. They note: “sinicization was also 
applied to the image, with a certain aesthetic decorative style, where the basic socialist-realist 
style was stuccoed over with Chinese motifs” (Berry and Farquhar, 1999: 83). However, what 
lies behind Chinese painting is the influence of Chinese traditional culture and what has shaped 
the aesthetic techniques of Chinese painting includes more profound cultural significances (that 
is, those that are deeper than the level of technique). 
        
Without the knowledge of Chinese traditional culture, and acknowledging its interaction with 
modernity in specific historical context, we fail to interpret ‘the National’ with enough cultural 
significance. If language is well established as a carrier of culture, then a national cinema can 
be seen as a new carrier of national culture/identity with the medium of film becoming one of 
the most immediate and popular ways for people to encounter another ‘country’ in the age of 
globalization. In the case of Chinese language cinemas very few Western scholars and even 
fewer Western audiences speak Mandarin and an important aspect of meaning is lost in 
translation. 
 
The quality of the acting is frequently noted as suffering in dubbed films, as the vocal 
qualities, tones, and rhythms of specific languages, combined with the gestures and 
facial expressions that mark national characters and acting styles, become literally lost 
in translation. (Betz, 2009: 50) 
 
This is even more complicated with Hong Kong and Chinese mainland cinema. During the 
shooting, Hong Kong often uses stars who speak either Cantonese or Mandarin. The final edit 
will then be dubbed into both Cantonese and Mandarin for two releases in the two areas.  For 
example, Tony Leung (Hong Kong born movie star) would be acting in Cantonese, whereas 
Jet Li (from Mainland China) would be acting in Mandarin. This means that in both languages, 
the lips rarely synchronize with the spoken words, as some actors will be speaking in one 
language and others in the other. Chinese mainland cinema is more complicated, as until very 
recently films were not allowed to use synchronous sound and all dialogue was recorded and 
dubbed in post-production, which again, often caused the vocal movements to fall out of 
synchronization. 
 
For viewers who are not familiar with Chinese traditional philosophies then further nuances of 
cultural meaning are easily overlooked. However, our emphasis of Chinese traditional culture 
does not deny modernity in the three countries whose cinemas we are investigating. By the 
term ‘modernity’, we are speaking of modernity both in and outside of cinema: the modernity 
in Chinese cinemas and the modernity in Chinese societies. Yau (2006: 212) offers a 
formulation of China’s relationship to modernity, noting that: “Since the nineteenth century, 
major historical events in China (wars, national calamities, revolutions, etc) have made four 
topics crucial to national consciousness – feudalism, subsistence, socialism and modernisation 
– and discourses are prompted in relation to them in numerous literary and cultural text”. 
        
Although Hong Kong and Taiwan had popular film industries since 1960s, mainland Chinese 
Cinema, Hong Kong cinema and Taiwanese cinema all underwent their modernization in the 
1980s which are characterized by the three film movements: the Fifth Generation, Hong Kong 
New Wave Cinema and Taiwanese New Cinema. In cross-cultural research, the impact of 
modernity (and its adjunct globalization) has had on the cultural traditions of Confucianism 
and Taoism is undeniable. Since 1949, Chinese traditional cultural values in Mainland China 
have encountered Marxism and socialism, more specifically, Maoism. In fact this encounter 
has fundamentally shaped Chinese minds and societies in Chinese mainland and though more 
indirectly (certainly until the re-incorporation of Hong Kong into the People’s Republic of 
China in 1997) that also of Hong Kong and Taiwan. For example, the anxiety for Hong Kong’s 
return to Mainland China in 1997 has not only affected individuals’ mind in Hong Kong but 
became a kind of collective cloud of depression hovering over the heads of Hongkongnese 
during the run-up to being handed back to the Chinese administration. Consequently many 
films of Hong Kong between 1980s and 1990s have inevitably been read as anxiety for its 
political ‘transaction’ in 1997, such as the English title of John Woo’s Ying Xiong Ben Se, which 
was translated into A Better Tomorrow with obvious political implications for Hong Kong’s 
future. 
        
Between 1966 and 1976 Mainland China’s economy was heavily damaged by the catastrophe 
of the Cultural Revolution. When it came to an end in 1976, the CCP realised that China’s 
economy was on the verge of collapse. In 1978 they launched the economic ‘Opening Policy’ 
and took economy as the core of the country, with the determination of developing economy 
by all means. Chairman Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the Second generation of the CCP, made 
the famous remark regarding the discussions of socialism and capitalism: “It doesn't matter if 
a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice” (Strother, 2006: 36). Although Chinese 
capitalism was initially developed in China since 1840s following the Opium War and reached 
its peak between 1927 and 1949 before the establishment of the PRC, it has never been fully 
developed pre 1949 because of China’s political complexities. Capitalism was also completely 
eliminated between 1949 and 1976 due to the rigid communist/Maoist ideology. Thus Deng’s 
black/white cat remark after the Cultural Revolution was quickly seized by the West for more 
sensitive political implication. On 6
th
 January 1986, Deng appeared on the cover of Time 
magazine as the Man of the Year. Ever since the ‘Opening Policy’ advocated by Deng, 
capitalism and Western secularism have interacted with Maoism, communism and Chinese 
traditional cultures, and the representations of these influences on Chinese cinemas are worthy 
of further exploration.                                                                              
        
Following the end of the ten-year Cultural Revolution in 1976, a cultural movement of 
searching for roots was initiated in cinema and literature. For many who experienced the loss 
of faith and ideology, the spiritual vacuum that resulted converged with the emergent 
commercialism in the 1980s. In response to this, Richard Madsen (1998) describes the situation 
in post-Cultural Revolution China as follows: 
 
The Cultural Revolution destroyed the religious aura that Mao had created around the 
Communist movement…even as the state withdrew from its religious pretension, 
though, the senseless violence of the Cultural Revolution had left the Chinese people 
with more profound questions than ever before about the ultimate meaning of life. In 
this moral vacuum, many Chinese were predisposed to look to traditional religion to 
make sense of the tragedies of history and to sustain new hope for the future. (Madsen, 
1998: 39) 
 
In Red Sorghum ‘my grandma’ avoids her arranged marriage by the use of her active sexuality. 
By having sex with ‘my grandpa’ in a red sorghum field her life takes a different turn. The bold 
expression of their sexual act is adventurous in mainland Chinese cinema in the 1980s and 
would seem to deliberately suggest the idea of potency and autonomy. This is both sexual and 
political in terms of the power to break social, moral constraints and with feudal (and 
communist) society. Zhang directly attacks feudal ideology in this film and indirectly also 
communist ideology and, in so doing, he also generates a specific idea of nation that is not in 
line with a political version of feudalism and communism which is current in contemporary 
China. He draws on notions of loyalty and the collective memory of the Japanese invasion in 
the 1930s. At the end of the film, when facing the invasion of a foreign enemy, ‘my grandma’ 
and the villagers where she lives sacrifice their own lives against Japanese for the sake of the 
country. The ending ties in with loyalty to the communist state but also expressed the emphasis 
in Confucianism of loyalty and1 patriotism to tudi. This is an obligation that takes precedence 
over all other moral obligations. In the film ‘my grandpa and my grandma’ win the trust of 
villagers and work hard to turn the wine workshop into prosperity before the Japanese invasion. 
This is an endeavor demanded by Confucianism. The theme of cultivation lies at the heart of 
Chinese civilization. As a key film of the Fifth Generation, Red Sorghum has a vital role in 
projecting a complex understanding of past and present mainland Chinese cultural identity. 
 
Conclusion 
With special focus on the new wave movement in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan in 
the 1980s, the article sets up a theoretical framework for the argument that 
‘Chineseness’/Chinese traditional cultural influences constitute at least one dimension of the 
shared identity across the ‘three Chinas’. The article suggests that there are commonalities of 
cultures based on traditional Chinese philosophies which surpass their territorial boundaries 
but which also produce distinctive projections of what Chinese cultural specificities might be 
in a modern context. 
 
In the case of all three cinemas that we are investigating, political intervention is an enormous 
influence in the constructedness of their nation-states. Regarding the cultural specificities of 
the three Chinese language cinemas, there is no way to escape an emphasis on the role of 
politics and political ideologies in the studies of the ‘three Chinas’. This political or government 
connection is, of course, not that unusual in the formation and shaping of national cinemas. 
French cinema, for instance is a good case of illustrating this. Like in many other nations, there 
has been strong government involvement in the film industry in France. The Centre National 
de la Cinématographie was established in order to serve the need of the state to create a national 
cinema in 1946 (Hayward, 1993). In the era of globalization, Berry (2011, 12) points out that 
in a transnational context “corporations have greater relative autonomy from the state in regard 
to at least the economy and can operate economically across state borders more easily.” Emilie 
Yue-yu Yeh and Darrell William Davis (2008, 37-51) propose the term ‘hype-national’ to 
describe the ‘transnational’ in three Chinese language cinemas by emphasizing the roles and 
functions of the government-owned China Film Group, which, according to them, seeks to 
implement national consolidation and transnational reach within the three areas. 
 
There is a fundamental question: what particular national identity a national cinema intends to 
project with the government intervention and nationalism ideologies in a certain historical 
period? In the Chinese case, the role of the political ideology has played an important role in 
the construction of national identity since 1949 both in Mainland China, Taiwan and to a lesser 
extent Hong Kong. The triumph of Communism and Maoism in Mainland China and the retreat 
of KMT to Taiwan initiated political competition as each tried to construct itself as the 
legitimate site of China. After the Second World War (especially the Japanese occupation), 
nationalist ideology was also spread and represented in Hong Kong cinema. As mentioned, this 
is seen in Hong Kong martial arts films (such as Bruce Lee’s films) which were popular both 
in the East and the West since 1970s. Thus, national image and national identities shifted 
according to government interventions and their financial backing as well as different prevalent 
nationalist ideologies. As Hayward (1993: 6) indicates: “shifts according to which particular 
nation is being referred to because the concept of a nation’s cinema will change according to a 
nation’s ideology”. This point of view is similar to Higson’s argument (2002: 132-142): “the 
concept of a national cinema has almost invariably been mobilized as a strategy of cultural 
(and economic) resistance; a means of asserting national autonomy in the face of (usually) 
Hollywood’s international domination”. This is especially the case in Chinese mainland cinema 
and Taiwanese cinema post-1949 when both competed to construct themselves as the legitimate 
site for a Chinese nation-state. For Hong Kong, being a British colony for one hundred and 
fifty seven years, cinema has also been a particular site for the articulation of identity in a 
colonial contact. Such political intervention in the constructedness of national identity deserves 
to be further explored in the contexts of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. For example, 
Government intervention and especially the influences of a Communist ideology are of great 
importance to the projected national identity in mainland Chinese cinema after 1949. 
 
While allowing for their own political histories and identities the article opens up a debate on, 
and provides an alternative way, for seeing Taiwan and Hong Kong as ‘Chinese’. By replacing 
a traditional national cinema framework with a post-national and culturally based methodology, 
the article considers cultural affinity as greater than national and political boundaries, and 
provides an alternative way for seeing the three areas to continue to have contested political 
identities, while sharing a singular cultural identity.
References 
 
Anderson B. (1991), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso. 
Appadurai A. (1996). ‘Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy’, in Global 
Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity, ed. M. Featherstone, London: 
Sage. 
Berry C. and Farquhar A. M. (1999), ‘An Analysis of Yellow Earth and Black Canon Incident’, 
in Cinematic Landscapes, ed. C. E. Linda and D. Desser, Texas: University of Texas 
Press. 
Berry C. (2011), ‘Transnational Chinese Cinema Studies’, in S. H. Lim and J. Ward (Eds.), The 
Chinese Cinema Book (pp. 9-16), British Film Institute. 
Betz M. (2009), Beyond the Subtitle: Remapping European Art Cinema, University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Chow R., (1995), Primitive Passions, Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary 
Chinese Cinema, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Chu Y. H. (2004), ‘Taiwan’s National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-strait 
Relations’, in Asian Survey, vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 484-512. 
Confucius (1996), The Analects, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited. 
Crofts S., (1998), ‘Concepts of National Cinema’, in J. Hill and P. C. Gibson (Eds.), The Oxford 
Guide to Film Studies (pp. 385-94), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Faulkner C. (1994), ‘Affective Identities: French National Cinema and the 1930s’, in Canadian 
Journal of Film Studies, 3, 2:3-24. 
Hall S. (2004), ‘Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation’, in P. Simpson, A. Utterson & 
K. J. Shepheroson (Eds.), Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies (pp. 386-
97) , London: Routledge. 
Hayward S. (1993), French National Cinema, New York, Routledge. 
Higbee W. and Lim S. H. (2010), ‘Concepts of Transnational Cinema: Towards a Critical 
Transnationalism in Film Studies’, in Transnational Cinemas, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 7-21. 
Higson A. (2002), ‘The Concept of National Cinema’, in C. Fowler (Eds.), European Cinema 
Reader (pp.132-42), Routledge. 
Higson A. (2006), ‘The Limiting Imagination of National Cinema’, in E. Ezra and T. Rowden 
T. (Eds.), Transnational Cinema (pp.18), Routledge. 
Hobsbawm E. (2012), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Reissue 
edition. 
Lao Tzu (1997), Taoism, Cumberland, Wordsworth Editions Limited. 
Liu F. C. S. and Lee F. L. F. (2013), ‘Country, National, and Pan-national Identification in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong: Standing Together as Chinese?’, in Asian Survey, vol. 53, 
No. 6, pp. 1112-1134. 
Lu S. H. (1997), Transnational Chinese Cinema, University of Hawaii Press.  
Madsen R. (1998), China’s Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society, 
California: University of California Press. 
Orr J. (1993), Cinema and Modernity, Cambridge: Policy Press. 
Park M. and Chesla C. (2007), ‘Revisiting Confucianism as a Conceptual Framework for Asian 
Family Study’, in Journal of Family Nursing. 
<http://jfn.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/3/293> Accessed 23 June 2008. 
Schubert G. (2004), ‘Taiwan’s Politics Parties and National Identity’, in Asian Survey, vol. 53, 
No. 6, pp. 534-554. 
Strother S. And Strother B. (2006), Moon Living Abroad in China, Avalon Travel Publishing. 
Vincendeau G. (2001), Film/Literature/Heritage, London, British Film Institute.  
Vitali V. and Willemen P. (2006), Theorising National Cinema, London, BFI Publishing. 
Yau E. C. M., 2006, ‘Yellow Earth” Western Analysis and a Non-Western Text’, in Eleftheriois 
D. & Needham G. Hawaii (Eds.), Asian Cinemas: A Reader and Guide, University of 
Hawaii Press. 
Yeh E. Y. and Davis D. W. (2008), ‘Re-nationalizing China’s Film Industry: Case Study on the 
China Film Group and Film Marketization’, in Journal of Chinese Cinema vol. 2 no. 
1, pp.37-51. 
Yueh Y. (1998), ‘Defining “Chinese”’, in Jump Cut, 42:73-6,   
<http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/onlinpapers/JC42folder/DefiningChinese.html>. Accessed 
9 May 2010. 
Zhang Y. J. (2004), Chinese National Cinema, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
